Архив - Апр 2011

April 4th

Доминик Веннер "Тайные аристократии"


Nouvelle Revue d’Histoire, № 45 (2009)

Жан-Поль Сартр как-то сказал об Эрнсте Юнгере: «Я ненавижу его, не как немца, но как аристократа...»

У Сартра было несколько больших недостатков. Он с редким упорством заблуждался в своих политических настроениях. Он был весьма труслив во время оккупации, но как только опасность исчезла, он немедленно превратился в обличающего и обвиняющего аятоллу, жестоко критикуя тех из своих коллег, кто с необходимой слепотой не посвятил себя Сталину, Мао, или Пол Поту. Вместе с невероятно развитым нюхом на ошибки, у него была острая чувствительность к любому проявлению высокого духа, приводившего его в ужас, и нюх на низость, которая его привлекала.

Он не ошибался по поводу Юнгера. «Я ненавижу его, не как немца, но как аристократа...» Юнгер не был аристократом от рождения. Его семья принадлежала к утонченному среднему классу Северной Германии. Если он и был «аристократом» - другими словами, если он постоянно демонстрировал благородство и уравновешенность, как моральную, так и физическую – то не потому, что он был урожденным «фоном» – поскольку это не гарантирует от подлости духа и дел. Если он и был «аристократом», то не по иерархии людей, а по иерархии природы.

Героический воин в юности, сенсационный писатель «консервативной революции», позже ставший скорее отстраненным наблюдающим мудрецом, Юнгер прожил исключительную жизнь, пройдя через все опасности темного столетия и оставшись незапятнанным. Если он и является примером для подражания, то это в силу его постоянной «уравновешенности». Но его физическая уравновешенность была ничем иным, как проявлением уравновешенности духовной. Быть уравновешенным означает быть независимым. Независимым от низменных страстей и низменности страсти. Все то, что было в нем превосходным, неизменно отталкивало убогость, скверну и заурядность. Трансформация его личности, происшедшая в период, когда он написал «На мраморных скалах», может представляться неожиданной, но в ней нет ничего подлого. Позже, воин-ботаник переизобрел себя, написав в своем «Трактате о бунтаре», что то время требовало иного убежища, чем школы йоги. То были сладкие соблазны, которым он с тех пор успешно противостоял.

Я только что написал, что Юнгер не был аристократом от рождения. Я ошибся. Он был. Не по семейному происхождению, но в силу таинственной внутренней алхимии. Подобно маленькой девочке - консьежке из романа Мюриэля Барбери «Изящество ежа». Или же подобно Мартину Идену из одноименного романа Джека Лондона. Рожденный в глубокой бедности, Мартин Иден обладал благородной натурой. Простой случай позволяет ему познакомиться с утонченным и культурным миром среднего класса. Он влюбляется в молодую женщину из этого мира. Когда он открывает для себя литературу, в нем внезапно пробуждается талант писателя и фантастическая воля к самопреодолению; он полностью и бесповоротно оставляет позади свое прошлое, хотя это и стоит ему колоссального труда. Став знаменитым писателем, он одновременно открывает все тщеславие успеха и посредственность той молодой женщины-буржуа, которую он, как ему казалось, любил. Поэтому он совершает самоубийство. Но это никак не влияет на то, что я хочу сказать. Есть мартины идены, которым удается пережить их разочарование, и такие люди будут всегда. Это благородные, энергичные, и «аристократические» души. Но чтобы такие души смогли «отбиться от стаи», как говорят о хороших охотничьих собаках, и вознестись к вершине, им совершенно необходимы ролевые модели. Живые и исторические примеры внутреннего героизма и аутентичного благородства, идущие из глубины веков, как бы формируют тайное рыцарство, скрытый Орден. Гектор Троянский был их предшественником. Эрнст Юнгер был воплощением благородства в наше время. В этом Сартр не ошибся.

Evola "Ernst Jünger’s Der gordische Knoten"


East and West, vol. 5, no. 2, July 1954

The name of Ernst Jünger has achieved an almost European notoriety. However the importance of this writer as a philosopher concerns above all the early period of his activities. An ex-serviceman in the First World War, he appeared as a spokesman of what in his day was already known as the “burnt out generation.” His ideas were drawn not from abstract writing-desk speculations, but from a heroic experience which he had lived through, whence they gradually extended to the problem of the meaning of the human person in an epoch of nihilism and of the all-powerful machine. His watchwords were those of “heroic realism” and of the ethics of the “absolute person.”

Unfortunately Jünger’s later production, while it registered an apparent progress from the point of view of pure literature and style, showed a visible decline of level and of tension from the point of view of world outlook. The tendency of somewhat suspect humanism, associated with myths which by reaction have become fashionable in certain circles even of Central Europe after the late break-down, has somehow influenced his later writing.

We have had occasion to peruse a recently-published book of Jünger’s entitled The Gordian Knot (Der gordische Knoten, Frankfurt a.M., 1953). It professes to deal with relations between East and West, regarded as a basic historical theme, with the encounters which have taken place between Europe and Asia from the days of the Persian wars to the present time.

It is not easy to circumscribe the domain considered by Jünger. It hovers essentially between politics and ethics, while the religious and purely intellectual element is almost overlooked, a fact which proves prejudicial to the whole work, because, if we do not consider this element as the fundamental background of traditional Oriental civilizations, the whole problem appears badly presented. In this book we find a number of interesting observations, but they are scattered about here and there as if in a conversation, and there is a lack of systematic unity.

But the fundamental defect of the book is that it presents in terms of historical antitheses and of antithetical civilizations what are instead antitheses of universal spiritual categories, having no compulsory relations with particular peoples, civilizations or continents. Jünger often finds himself forced to admit it, as when he speaks of East and West, of Europe and Asia, not as of two historical and geographical concepts, but as of two possibilities which every man in every age carries within himself. Every people would indeed possess them, because, for instance, the typical features of Asiatic incursions into Europe and of the “Oriental” manner of warfare would reappear in civil wars in their opposition to regular wars.

But how can we then fail to notice that the greater part of the author’s considerations, which resort to historical and geographical references, whereas they should limit themselves to the domain of a morphology or a typology of civilizations and of world outlooks, and which claim actually to conclude with a diagnosis of the present situation, are compromised by a fundamental one-sidedness and ambiguity?

That this is the case can be easily proved if we examine some of the main motifs of the book, in the first place, that whence its very title, i.e. the Gordian knot, is drawn. The Gordian knot should represent the problem which always arises with every encounter between Asia and Europe when domination over the world is in question.

The Gordian knot should represent Asia, the sword of Alexander Europe. The former should be the symbol of destiny of an existence bound by elementary or divine forces, of a world characterized by a lack of limits, of a political society essentially despotic and arbitrary. The sword of Alexander should instead represent the luminous element, spiritual power, and be the symbol of a world acknowledging freedom, law, human respect, a greatness which cannot be reduced to mere power.

At one point of the book the antithesis is even made equivalent to that between the Titanic powers, vast and shapeless, and the Olympic powers eternally fighting against them, because the former also represent the substratum of elementary forces ever re-emerging from the depths and offering possibilities for new triumphs and further progress.

We need only bear this formulation in mind to realize the absurdity of talking about East and West. In fact that antagonistic myth is invested with an universal character, it is found in the mythologies and sagas of all civilizations, and in the East it has been formulated not less distinctly than in Hellenic civilization (we need only remember the dualism of Mazdaism, the Hindu themes about the struggle between deva and asûra, or the exploits of Indra, etc.); it reflects therefore a vision of life by no means specifically European.

Moreover, if we refer to a metaphysical plan, it is quite absurd to associate the East with an existence subject to the powers of destiny and of the earth. If there is a civilization which has not only formulated the notion of an absolute freedom, of a freedom so high that even the realm of the heaven and the realm of the pure Being appear as a form of bondage, but which has furthermore known a definite technical tradition to realize that ideal, such a civilization is definitely that of the East.

But Jünger seems to wish to keep to a more conditioned plan, closer also to that of political forces. But here too the argument does not hold water. The antithesis of the Western ideal of political freedom as against Asian despotism is an old story, which may have been a “myth” dear to certain Hellenic historians, but which is devoid of all serious foundation.

To justify it we should limit ourselves to considering certain inferior by-products of a degenerating and barbarous East, with local sartraps and despots, with hordes of Tartars, Huns and Mongols, and some aspects of the latest Arabo-Iranian and Arabo-Persian cycles. At the same time we should overlook the recurrent phenomena of the same kind in the West, including the methods of those tyrants and princes who were devoid all human respect in the age of the Italian Renaissance.

Indeed Jünger himself goes counter to his own thesis when he points out that in the evolution of Roman history, especially during the Imperial period, both forms were present. He fully realizes that it is not possible here to bring forward an eventual Asiatic racial contribution as the only capable of giving an explanation, so that he has to resort, as we have pointed out, not to a historic Asia, but rather to an Asia as a permanent possibility latent in everyone.

In any case, coming down to modern times, the impossibility of sensibly utilizing that antithesis in any way, appears ever more obvious to Jünger himself. Here then his antithesis on the one hand almost identifies itself with that proper to the political terminology of today, in which the “West” is identified with the Euro-American democratic world and the “East” with Bolshevik Russia; in addition with regard to certain features drawn by him from the “Asiatic” style, concerning the manner of waging war, of estimating the individual, of despotism, of exploiting vanquished peoples and prisoners of war, of wholesale slaughter, etc. he tends to perceive them, in a rather one-sided manner, actually in Hitler’s Germany. What can all this mean?

In any case even in this connection things are not quite right, and it is odd that Jünger has not noticed it. Leaving Asia and Europe aside, and considering instead these conceptions in themselves, the true synthesis does not lie between freedom and tyranny, but rather between individualism and the principle of authority. Of a system based on the principle of authority everything like tyranny, despotism, Bonapartism, the dictatorship of tribunes of the people, is nothing more than a degeneration or an inverted falsification.

By reverting to the domain of historical civilizations it would be easy indeed to show to what extent the traditional East, as far as concerns the doctrine of the Regnum, admitted ideals very different from individual despotism. We need only refer to the Far Eastern Imperial conception, with its theory of the “mandate from Heaven” and the strict political ethic of Kong-tse. In the Nitisara we are asked to explain how he who cannot dominate himself (his own manas) can dominate other men, and in the Arthaçâstra the exercise of royal functions is conceived as tapas, i.e. ascetism, ascetism of power. We might easily multiply references of this kind.

There is no doubt that the East has had a characteristic tendency toward the Unconditional, which has been the case only merely sporadically with the West, by no means to its advantage. This might shed a different light even on what Jünger calls the Willkürakt, and which in him seems almost to play the part of an anguish complex. As a matter of fact a world outlook, wherein the extreme point of reference is the Unconditional, law in actual practice or in the abstract, can never constitute the extreme instance on any plane, neither on the human nor on the divine plane.

We do not wish to dwell here on an evident contradiction into which Jünger falls: how can he conciliate the idea of the East as a world subject to the bonds of destiny and of necessity with that other idea, according to which the absolute act, the Willkürakt, is alleged to be an Eastern category? Furthermore, although it is a case of horizons already different, by such implications we had to recognize Asia in its purity, well, in Nietzsche and in Stirner.

But it is more important to consider another aspect of the question. Jünger tells of a visit by the Count of Champagne to the head of the Order of the Ishmaelites at the time of the Crusades. At a sign from his host some knights threw themselves down from the top of a wall. Asked if his own knights were capable of similar obedience and fealty, the Count replied in the negative.

We have here, Jünger declares – something which a European mind cannot grasp, because it borders on the absurd, on folly, because it offends all human values. We have the sentiments before the Japanese airmen devoting themselves to death. In the late war, he adds, in Italy and Germany exploits were conceived and actually carried out which involved extreme risks, but not a previous acceptance of irrevocable sacrifices by the individual.

Now these considerations are in part one-sided, in part due to misunderstanding. With regard to the first point we shall mention a single instance. Ancient Rome, which certainly did not belong to “Asia,” knew the ritual of the so-called devotio: a military commander volunteered to die as a victim of the infernal powers in order to promote an outbreak of them, and thus to bring about the defeat of the enemy.

The second point, however, is more important. Jünger should have known that the Ishmaelites were not merely a military Order, but also an Order of initiates. Within the orbit of initiation all ethics of a merely human nature, however elevated, cease to have any validity. Even on the level of mere religion we find the sacrifice of Isaac as a trial and a disciple of absolute “corpse-like” obedience – perinde ac cadaver according to the formula of the Jesuits– in the domain of monastic ascetism. Calvin went so far as to consider the possibility of renouncing eternal salvation for the sake of love of God.

As for the Order of the Ishmaelites, there is a specific point which should be born in mind: absolute obedience to the extreme limit, as illustrated in the above-mentioned episode, had also the value of discipline and was limited to the lower ranks of the initiatic hierarchy; once the individual will is eliminated, above the fourth degree an absolutely contrary principle reigns, that of absolute freedom, so much so that some one referred to the Order of the Ishmaelites the principle that “Nothing exists, everything is permitted.”

A mere Crusading knight could hardly attain such horizons: a Knight Templar might perhaps done so, for the Order of the Templars also had an initiatic background. Were Jünger to realize all this he might begin to understand what was the right place even for what he calls the Willkürakt and the limitations of the validity for ethics of personality and for an ideal of purely human civic greatness.

Here indeed higher existential dimensions come into play, and not only in the case of an organization of initiates. For instance, when it comes to those “absolute sacrifices” of a heroic nature, we should not forget that it is, in a general way, a question of civilizations, in which the human earthly existence is not considered, as it is with us, unique and incapable of repetition. Even on the level of popular religion and of the normal outlook of life in those civilizations the individual has the feeling or foreboding that his existence does not begin with birth nor end with death on earth; thus we find potentially present that consciousness and that higher dimension, to which only in exceptional case the religious views which have to come to prevail in the West offers a suitable atmosphere.

The most important result of these latter considerations is probably the following. Putting aside East and West, Asia and Europe as civilizations and as historic realities, we may place our consideration on the plane to which Jünger has in his book been more than once forced to shift himself, i.e. on the plane of a morphological determination of the various layers and possibilities of the human beings.

We should then have three levels. On the lowest we should place all those possibilities which Jünger has associated with the “Gordian knot,” with elementary and savage forces, with everything that is limitless, with the daemonism of destruction, with that which is ruthless, with an absence of all human respect, with affirmation devoid of all law.

In an intermediate zone we should place the sum total of possibilities contained within the framework of a civilization which recognizes the value of humanitas, of law, of individual and civil freedom, of culture in the ordinary meaning of the word.

The higher level is here represented by that spirituality which Jünger associates with the symbols of Alexander’s sword, while the lower level is made up of the values which have provided the foundations of the latest bourgeois and liberal civilization.

But we must recognize as the highest zone that of possibilities which through the formal analogies which two opposite poles ever present reflect certain features of the first zone, because here it is a domain wherein the human tie is surpassed, where neither the mere human individual nor the current criterion of human greatness any longer represents the limit, because within it the Unconditional and the absolutely transcendental asserts itself. Some of the culminating points of Oriental spirituality refer in fact to this zone. If only a limit as slender as a razor’s edge at times separates this domain from the former, yet the difference between the two is abysmal, whereas opposition to what is merely human is common to both.

Now it is important to point out that wherever forces belonging to the first of the three domains emerge and break forth, only the possibilities of the third domain can really face them. Any attempt to stem on the basis of forces and values of the intermediate zone can only be precarious, provisional and relative.

To conclude, we may associate with this a remark concerning that diagnosis of the present situation, to which Jünger’s book claims to have contributed. In the first phase of his activities, and above all in his books Feuer und Blut (1926) and Der Arbeiter (1932), he had rightly perceived that the age beginning in the West with the advent of mechanical civilization and of the first “total” wars is characterized by the emergence of “elementary” forces operating in a destructive manner, not only materially, but also spiritually, not only in the vicissitude of warfare, but also in cosmopolitan mechanized life.

The merit of Jünger in that first phase of his thought is that he had recognized the fatal error of those who think that everything may be brought back to order, that this new menacing world, ever advancing, may be subdued or held on the basis of the vision of life of the values of the preceding age, that is to say of bourgeois civilization.

If a spiritual catastrophe is to be averted modern man must make himself capable of developing his own being in a higher dimension – and it is in this connexion that Jünger had announced the above-mentioned watchword of “heroic realism” and pointed out the ideal of the “absolute person,” capable of measuring himself with elementary forces, capable of seizing the highest meaning of existence in the most destructive experiences, in those actions wherein the human individual no longer counts: of a man acclimatized to the most extreme temperatures and having behind the “zero point of every value.” It is obvious that in all this Jünger had a presentiment of the metaphysical level of life in the third of the domains which we have mentioned.

But in this new book we see that he confuses this domain with the first, and that the chief points of reference for everything which Jünger associates with the symbol of the West are drawn to a great extent from the intermediate zone – still far enough from the “zero point of every value” and not wholly incompatible with the ideas beloved in the preceding bourgeois period, even if raised to a dignified form and integrated with some of the values of the good European tradition.

This leads to a dangerous confusion of horizons, and at all events marks a retrogression from the positions already achieved by Jünger in his first period. His more recent works, including the one which we have been discussing, while they are rich in interesting suggestions, offer us nothing which has a real basic value.

We have moreover seen that in this book on the Gordian knot the East is an one-sided and partly arbitrary notion which has nothing to do with the actual reality of the higher traditional Oriental civilizations, while throughout the whole work we perceive with sufficient clarity the reactions of those who, without having any adequate sense of distance, draw conclusions from the most recent political vicissitudes and who would reduce the conflict between East and West merely to that between the world of the democratic Euro-American nations, with their own outworn ideals which are trying to present themselves in terms of a new European humanism, and the world of Soviet Communism.

Alain de Benoist "Jünger & Drieu La Rochelle"


transl. by Greg Johnson

In his Pariser Tagebücher [Paris Diaries], Ernst Jünger refers to his meetings in German-occupied Paris with Pierre Drieu La Rochelle (for example on October 11th, 1941 and on April 7th, 1942). Drieu was then the editor in chief of La Nouvelle Revue française, published by Gallimard. Thursdays, Jünger often attended the literary salon of Florence Gould, to which Gerhard Heller introduced him, and where he became acquainted with Paul Léautaud, Henry de Montherlant, Marcel Jouhandeau, Alfred Fabre-Luce, Jean Schlumberger, Jean Cocteau, Paul Morand, Jean Giraudoux, and many others. Later, Jouhandeau would remember of him as a “very simple man, very young looking, with a delicate face, and who wore civilian clothing, a bow tie.”[1]

On November 16th, 1943, Jünger noted in his journal that he had again seen Drieu La Rochelle at the German Institute of Paris, then directed by Karl Epting. He told him that they had “exchanged fire in 1915. It was near Godat, the village where Hermann Löns fell. Drieu also remembered the bell that sounded the hours there: we both heard it.” Many years later, in his discussions with Antonio Gnoli and Franco Volpi, Jünger, now 100 years old, recalled this memory again: “When we met, we often spoke about our experiences of the First World War: we had fought in the same zone of the front, he on the French side, I on the German side, and we heard, on opposite sides, the sound of the bells of the same church.”[2]

It should be no surprise that the two men were drawn together at the start by their memories of the Great War. It had marked them deeper than anything else, like so many men of their generation. But between Jünger and Drieu La Rochelle, there were many other points in common. Deeply impressed by the reading of Nietzsche, both aspired to a African adventure in their youth: Jünger enlisted in the French Foreign Legion, while in 1914 Drieu requested to be assigned to the Moroccan riflemen (in both cases, the experience was brief). Above all, both men were political theorists as well as writers—simultaneously in the case of Drieu, successively in that of Jünger. Both justifiably could be described, at one point of their lives or another as “national revolutionaries.” Both, finally, incontestably were revolutionary conservatives, eager to safeguard values that they considered eternal, but at the same time conscious that the advent of the modern world created chasms across which one cannot return. Yet, despite all that, many things separated them.

Jünger described the First World War almost under fire, while Drieu waited twenty years to write La comédie de Charleroi.[3] (Moreover, having been discharged in 1939, he did not take part in the Second World War). In the first of the six short stories of this book, which is certainly one of his masterpieces, he recalls an assault against the Germans in 1914 in the area of Charleroi. This description is done within the framework of a visit of the battlefield made five years later by the narrator in the company of a rich bourgeois who lost his son in this battle. One notes that 20 years later, beyond any ideological justification, Jünger and Drieu perceived war as a law inherent in human nature, even as a rehabilitation of “natural man” in the totality of his instincts. “It is life in the most terrible form that the creator ever gave it,” Jünger wrote.[4] For Drieu as for Jünger, war is first of all what frees us from the bourgeois world and reveals man in his truth.

However, both also assessed how much the Great War, which started in 1914 as a traditional war, was transformed little by little into a war of a completely new type: a deployment of gigantically impersonal forces, a “duel of machines so formidable that beside them man no longer exists, so to speak.”[5] But the advent of “technical war” particularly horrified Drieu, who saw it as a “malevolent revolt of matter against human control,” a true “industrial butchery,” whereas for Jünger it gave birth to the intuition of a new human type, completely opposed to the bourgeois: that of the bourgeois man: the Worker, whose “heroic realism” would be able to ensure the mobilization (Mobilmachung) of the world. For Jünger, the “armies of machines” herald the “battalions of workmen,” the experience of the war having conferred on man a disposition (Bereitschaft) to “total mobilization,” i.e., a will to domination (Herrschaft) expressed by means of Technology.

Drieu shares nothing of this optimistic and voluntarist vision. In the inter-war period, he opposed a right that continued to preach the old “warlike values” without realizing that these values have no worse enemy than modern war. “Modern military war is in every way an abomination,” he wrote in 1934 in Socialisme fasciste (Fascist Socialism).[6] According to Drieu, the reign of Technology, far from heralding the advent of a new man, implies on the contrary a degradation of man. As is well-known, it is was only later, under the double influence of Heidegger and his brother, Friedrich Georg Jünger, that Jünger began to reflect critically on Technology and its “titanic” nature, extending and deepening the purely instinctive reaction of Drieu.

After having served on the front, which brought a kind of mystical experience, both writers believed it possible to retain what they gained on the battlefield in civilian life. “We will be able to establish peace as we carried out the war,” Drieu wrote in its first book, a collection of poems entitled Interrogation.[7] At the same time, Jünger also resolved to transform military defeat into civilian victory. This resolution explains his political commitment.

Their relationship to politics, however, is not the same. In the 1920s, Jünger joined the ranks of the nationalists out of deep and fiery convictions. Drieu, however, plunged in to ward off his own hesitations. The author of Le Feu follet (The Will o’ the Wisp)[8] belongs to those men who came to politics starting from philosophy, with the need to find concrete incarnations of ideas corresponding to their vision of the world. More than an actor, he wanted to be an observer. During the Great War, moreover, whereas Jünger was completely engaged in the “storms of steel,” Drieu was in combat only intermittently, although that did not prevent him from being wounded three times.

In many respects, Drieu was a dilettante. Regarding his Journal of the years 1939–1945, which was published only in 1992, one can even speak about his “indifference to any deep ideological conviction,” of his “fickleness” (Julien Hervier). This is not inaccurate, but one absolutely should not see the least trace of opportunism in this attitude. Germanophile but Anglomaniac, haunted by decadence but conscious that his own work fits a certain definition of it, Drieu is a man of doubts, about-face changes, and oscillations—perhaps manifesting his bourgeois origins.

One sees this clearly in his relations with women. The author of a beautiful novel entitled L’homme couvert de femmes (The Man Covered with Women) (1925),[9] which may be largely autobiographical, Drieu loved women, but not for themselves. His Don Juanism, of quasi-Platonic inspiration, is articulated around the desire to seduce and of the “insane idea of beauty”: “Impossible for me to attach to a woman, impossible for me to abandon her. I found none of them beautiful enough. Beautiful enough internally or externally.”[10] This is why this man “covered with women” was always lonely. The same applied to politics: no political regime could attract him completely, just as no woman was sufficiently “beautiful” for him.

But it is precisely because he is attracted by an unattainable ideal and perpetually divided between contradictory impulses that Pierre Drieu La Rochelle did not cease fighting against what he regarded as false alternatives. Interrogation contains the poem “And Dreams and Action.” The juxtaposition of these two words translates quite precisely what he sought to reconcile all his life. Drieu wanted to reconcile dream and action, as he wanted to reconcile soul and body, the world of war and that of the spirit.

He interpreted the history of Europe as the slow rise of the bourgeois ideology which led to the rupture of equilibrium between soul and body and subjected man to the noxious influence of life in the big cities. His great task was the reconciliation of the soul and the body. In his Notes pour comprendre le siècle (Notes to Comprehend the Century) (1941),[11] he writes: “The new man participates in the body, he knows that the body is the articulation of the soul and that the soul cannot be expressed, cannot deploy itself, except though the body.”

Drieu’s attitude is that of a dandy. Yet many authors also Jünger as a rather typical representative of dandyism. Nicolas Sombart writes:

The dandy represents the type of man who stylizes himself. . . . He has sublimated the will to power into a will to style. . . . Endeavoring to stylize himself, he stylizes the world and accomplishes this mission when he captures a situation in an elegant formulation. . . . For that, he must subject himself to discipline, abnegation, and rigorous asceticism.[12]

“Distance, beauty, impassibility, such are the elements of Jüngerian dandyism,” writes Julien Hervier for his part.[13] One thinks here of the ideal of “active impersonality” preached by another theorist of dandyism, the Italian Julius Evola. However, Drieu is more of a dandy than Jünger, because the former preaches “engagement for engagement’s sake,” as of others might speak of “art for art’s sake.”

Drieu gives history the same impassioned attention that Jünger gives botany or entomology. But for him, history is essentially in flux, governed by chance, whereas Jünger strives to read, behind surface appearances and movement, the “harmonious permanence of a stable order” (Julien Hervier). In Jünger, history is never a purely human phenomenon. Instead, it traces back to an invisible necessity, a kind of metaphysics of destiny, of forces that exceed it. This is why Jünger is not interested so much in history as in what lies beyond history. That is why he is interested in myth.

Drieu, who had dreamed of becoming a priest or monk, and who, in the Foreword of one of his more famous novels, Gilles (1939),[14] wrote that if he could re-live his life, he would devote it to the history of religion, was also passionately interested in myth. Like Jünger, he refers constantly to the sacred, but never tries to relate it to a particular religion. For him, the sacred is synonymous with the divine, and the divine is more immanent that transcendent.

He was already using religious terms to describe the brutal reality of the Great War. When the bombs burst, he exclaimed: “These are not men, it is the Good god, the Good god himself, the Hard one, the Brutal one!” (La comédie de Charleroi). For him, the war was just like religion: a sacred kind of test. Everywhere in his work, the bond between the soldier’s life and asceticism, the bond between action and religion, is manifest.

Finally, Drieu, like Jünger—who says that the cosmos for him has a divine and sacred dimension—holds that “nature is animated, speaking, innumerably prodigious.” Jünger seldom employs the word “God,” unlike Drieu, who uses it frequently. But, from Nietzsche’s claim that “God is dead,” he draws the conviction that “God must be conceived in a new way.”

Jünger definitively moved away from politics in the early 1930s, while Drieu was never detached. As Julien Hervier notes, the need for engagement leads Drieu to an ethics of action for action’s sake. Under the Occupation, it is this concern with engagement on principle that led him to continue to write political articles although politics hardly interested him anymore. Reading his journal, one sees that his true interests inclined him toward Eastern spirituality.

It amounts to saying that for Drieu, politics was never more than “a reason for curiosity and the object of distant speculation” which never exercised more than a “fitful” attraction.[15] Rejecting the bourgeois and democratic world, he certainly never creased believing in the possibility of a non-Marxist socialism. But in his fashion, i.e., “by fits and starts,” and not without a certain blindness to the reality of things.

Jünger withdrew from politics because he took the full measure of the “Mauritanian” spirit, whereas Drieu, on the contrary, continued his engagement because he thought that in life, one is obliged to get one’s hands dirty. By adopting this attitude, the dandy saves himself relative to the collapse he observes all around him. When the battle is lost, there remains only the beauty of the gesture.

At the end of the Second World War, Drieu felt he was watching the end of a world, the end of an era: “France is finished. . . . But all the fatherlands are finished.” One should, however, recall that he constantly pled for Europe. In 1931, he published a book entitled L’Europe contre les patries (Europe against the Fatherlands).[16] In 1934, in La comédie de Charleroi, he wrote: “Today, France or Germany, it is too small.”

Jünger—who was always a Francophile, as Drieu was a Germanophile—also knew how to step back from narrow national memberships: Der Arbeiter already poses the problem of globalism that after the war he discussed in his essay on the universal state.

Drieu dreamt only of regeneration. Like Nietzsche, he thinks one should not seek to save what is crumbling but instead accelerate its collapse. In his journal, he declares that he desires the destruction of the West and calls for a barbarian invasion that will sweep away this dying civilization: “It is with joy that I greet the rise of Russia and Communism. It will be atrocious, atrociously destructive.”[17]

At the same time, he also wrote: “I regarded Fascism only as a step towards Communism.” The ease with which Drieu praised Stalinist Communism as well as Fascism or National Socialism, placing on the former the quickly disappointed hopes inspired by the latter, will surprise only those who are entirely ignorant of National Bolshevism, incarnated for example by Ernst Niekisch, who was a very close friend of Jünger’s in the 1920s.

In his youth, under Niekisch’s influence, Jünger also saw the Communists as the best preparers of the “revolution without qualifications”[18] that it would celebrate in Der Arbeiter. Later, but from an entirely different viewpoint, he would emphasize the extent to which Communism and National Socialism paralleled each other in the introduction of Technology into political life, thus expressing a common adhesion to modernity, under the horizon of a will to power that Heidegger had unmasked as a mere “will to will.” One finds similar reflections in Genève ou Moscou (Geneva or Moscow) (1928),[19] where Drieu stresses that capitalism and Communism are the twin heirs of the Machine: “Both are the dark and burning children of industry.”[20]

However, Drieu was at the same time tempted by retreat, by retiring to the sidelines. One of his last novels L’homme à cheval (The Man on Horseback),[21] published in 1943, tells the story of a South American dictator, Jaime Torrijos, who, after having seized power in Bolivia, tried to create an empire. Unable to attain this goal, he retires from politics to resuscitate the Inca rites.

Like hero of L’homme à cheval, Drieu dreamed “of something deeper than politics, or rather that deep and rare politics that fuses with poetry, music and, who knows, perhaps high religion.” But he did not know how to proceed in that direction. Perhaps he did not have in him the resources that would have enabled him to become a Waldgänger or Anarch.

Jünger also had the feeling that an epoch in world history was completed. It was completed with the appearance of the Worker, who inaugurated the global reign of “the elemental.” The old gods died or fled; the new gods are yet to be born. We have entered the era of the Titans. To step back, Jünger successively created the Figure (Gestalt) of the Waldgänger, who takes a distance, then that of the Anarch, who takes height.

The attitude of the Anarch is similar in some respects to the “apoliteia” preached by Julius Evola. But this Figure, like that of the Waldgänger, clearly poses the problem of the place of the individual in relation to the great historical processes that affect the world. Jünger evokes in this respect “the individual taken separately, the great Solitary, able to resist the spiritual challenges of that which is heralded and will become a new ‘Iron Age.’”[22]

One could speak here of a Jüngerian “individualism.” Jünger’s individualism of is certainly not hedonistic individualism, which reflects the selfishness and the utilitarianism of the bourgeois world, but rather the assertion of the prerogatives of the isolated individual (der Einzelne) who can spontaneously recognize others of his kind.

In Drieu La Rochelle, on the other hand, there are unquestionable traces of this bourgeois individualism, which he energetically condemns from the historical point of view, but which he does not always manage to escape himself. The majority of his novels are nothing more than stories about individuals, and his characters are quite often mere expressions of himself. Also, both writers give different roles to individuals and elites. While Drieu aspires to a new political aristocracy, Jünger is situated on a higher plane: the spiritual accord that can be established between men able to spiritually dominate their time.

Just like Henry de Montherlant, just like Yukio Mishima and so many others, Pierre Drieu La Rochelle finally committed suicide. But one would be wrong to explain his suicide merely as a political defeat, even if he himself encouraged this by saying, in substance: “I played, I lost, I claim death.” In fact, Drieu had been tempted by suicide since childhood. He had written: “When I was an adolescent, I promised myself to remain faithful to youth: one day, I tried to keep my word.” In dying, like the hero of his novel Le feu follet (The Will o’ the Wisp),[23] Drieu remained faithful to this temptation from his childhood. Previously, he had written in his journal: “The beauty of death consoles a life badly lived. God, what was my life? Some women, the charge of Charleroi, some words, viewing some landscapes, statues, tableaux, and that’s it.”[24]

Ernst Jünger wrote that “suicide belongs to the capital of humanity,” and it is a maxim that Montherlant had noted in his notebooks when he himself decided to commit suicide in September 1972. Jünger also saw many close friends commit suicide, particularly at the time of the July 1944 assassination attempt against Hitler (Hans von Kluge, Henrich von Stülpnagel) and at the end of the Second World War. But for him suicide remained an abstract possibility, negative in its essence, while for Drieu, for whom death was “the secret of life,” the suicide had a mystical value.

On September 7th, 1944, when he was in Kirchhorst, Jünger learned that Drieu had committed suicide in Paris. “It seems,” he wrote, “that under the terms of some law, those who had noble reasons to cultivate friendship between peoples fall without mercy, while the low profiteers wriggle away.” In his conversations with Julien Hervier, he later said that he was “deeply distressed” that Drieu “committed suicide in a moment of despair.” “His death,” he added, “truly pained me. He was a man who had suffered much. Thus there are people who feel friendship for a certain nation, as many Frenchmen came to feel for us, which brought them no luck.”[25] On September 6th, 1992, he wrote to Julien Hervier: “Gallimard sent me your edition of Drieu’s diaries; reading them was moving. The critics have, so far as I know, not grasped the significance of his work. I have made some notes on it for Siebzig verweht IV. A copy is enclosed.”

Words to remember. Between these two men, there was brotherhood.

Notes

[1] Marcel Jouhandeau, “Mon ami Ernst Jünger” [“My friend Ernst Jünger”], in Hommage à Ernst Jünger [Homage to Ernst Jünger], ed. Georges Laffly, special issue of La Table ronde, Paris, Winter 1976, p. 9.

[2] Ernst Jünger, Les prochains Titans [The Coming Titans] (Paris: Grasset, 1998), 99.

[3] Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, The Comedy of Charleroi and Other Stories, trans. Douglas Gallagher (Cambridge: Rivers Press, 1973)—Ed.

[4] Ernst Jünger, Le combat comme expérience intérieure, trans. François Poncet (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1997), 244.

[5] Le combat comme experience intérieure, 243.

[6] Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Socialisme fasciste (Paris: Gallimard, 1934)—Ed.

[7] Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Interrogation (Paris: Gallimard, 1917)—Ed.

[8] Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Le Feu Follet (Paris: Gallimard, 1931)—Ed.

[9] Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, L’homme couvert de femmes (Paris: Gallimard, 1935)—Ed.

[10] Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Journal (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 512.

[11] Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Notes pour comprendre le siècle (Paris: Gallimard, 1941)—Ed.

[12] Nicolas Sombart, “Le dandy dans sa maison forestière: remarques sur le cas Ernst Jünger” [“The dandy in his Forest House: Remarks on the Case of Ernst Jünger”], in Ernst Jünger, ed. Philippe Barthelet (Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 2000), 396.

[13] Julien Hervier, Deux individus contre l’histoire : Drieu La Rochelle, Ernst Jünger [Two Individuals against History: Drieu La Rochelle, Ernst Jünger] (Paris: Klincksieck, 1978), 86.

[14] Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Gilles (Paris: Gallimard, 1939)—Ed.

[15] Journal, 437 and 309.

[16] Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, L’Europe contre les patries (Paris: Gallimard, 1931)—Ed

[17] Journal, 379.

[18] Die Standarte, November 23, 1925.

[19] Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, Genève ou Moscou (Paris: Gallimard, 1928)—Ed.

[20] Genève ou Moscou, 131.

[21] Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, L’homme à cheval (Paris: Gallimard, 1943).

[22] Les prochains Titans, 102.

[23] Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, The Will o’ the Wisp, trans. Robinson Martin (London: Calder and Boyars, 1966)—Ed.

[24] Journal, 304.

[25] Julien Hervier, Entretiens avec Ernst Jünger (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), 127. In English: Julien Hervier, The Details of Time: Conversations with Ernst Jünger, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (New York: Marsilio, 1995), 106.

Alain de Benoist "The Jünger–Heidegger Correspondence"


transl. by Greg Johnson

When two great men—and what great men, in fact the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century and one of its most important writers!—correspond with one another, what do they discuss? Not always great things: they also exchange pleasantries and speak of their publications, travels, and trivial preoccupations. But sometimes the tone rises. And sometimes it becomes sublime, as in 1956 when Jünger consulted Heidegger about the exact meaning of a maxim of Rivarol and received a veritable course in philosophy, stupefying in depth, on the concepts of time and movement.

The correspondence of Ernst Jünger and Martin Heidegger began in 1949 regarding plans for a journal called Pallas to be edited by the essayist Armin Mohler (who was Jünger’s private secretary from 1949 to 1953). This project came to nothing—but subsequently Jünger, along with the historian of religions Mircea Eliade, created another journal called Antaios. Their correspondence continued until Heidegger’s death in May 1976. Published in Germany in 2008, it is now available in French, beautifully translated, edited, and annotated by Julien Hervier.[1] It offers a rare kind of pleasure.

It was the preceding year, at the end of 1948, that Jünger first met Heidegger in his hut in the forest at Todtnauberg. Later he wrote: “From the beginning, there was something—not only something beyond word and thought, but beyond the man himself” (Rivarol and other Essays).

One is then in the immediate post-war period, a sad and painful time when the two men were treated as if they were radioactive. Jünger, on June 25th, 1949, wrote this superb sentence: “In the course of these last years, it has become quite clear to me that silence is the strongest of weapons, provided that it is dissimulated behind something that deserves to be hushed up.”

But what is most striking about these letters is the difference in tone between the philosopher and the writer. Both men genuinely admired one another, but intellectually Heidegger completely dominated his interlocutor. Jünger does not offer the slightest criticism of Heidegger, but the reverse is not entirely the case.

Indeed, Jünger—unlike his brother Friedrich Georg Jünger—did not have a genuinely philosophical mind. He lets on that Heidegger’s works, about which he knew little, were sometimes above his head. In November 1967, he noted: “Your texts are difficult and hardly translatable: thus I am always astonished by the influence as they exert on the intelligent French.” Everything indicates that Jünger had been more impressed by Heidegger’s intellectual charisma than by his thought properly speaking. He was also more inclined to pay visits, more eager to maintain relations with his contemporary. Heidegger was more reluctant to move, more estranged from “social” life—more concerned about the essential. As Lao-Tzu said about the sage: “He does not act, but he accomplishes.”

Heidegger, moreover, said explicitly that in his eyes Jünger was not a “thinker” (Denker). He was a man who theorized based on his experience, on what he saw and lived (beginning with his experiences in the trenches of the First World War), but not from what can only be thought. Jünger, in other words, had ideas more than he had thought. He was an “Erkenner,” a man who “recognizes,” more concerned to open up “new optics” than to arrive at “new truths.” This is why Heidegger writes:

He [Jünger] does not have the slightest idea of what occurs in the “objectification” of the world and man. Ultimately his knowledge remains psychological and moral. . . . He always remains within metaphysics. . . . Because Jünger does not see what is uniquely “thinkable,” he regards the fulfillment of metaphysics as the essence of the will to power as the dawn of a new era, whereas it constitutes only a prelude to the rapid decrepitude of all recent innovations, destined to founder in the ennui of a nothingness of insignificance that incubates this abandonment of Being that is proper to beings.

Difficult language? There’s more.

Heidegger, in any case, was interested in Jünger for a long time. In 1932, The Worker, the great theoretical book of the veteran of the front, held Heidegger’s attention like few other works. During the winter semester 1939–40 at the University of Freiburg, Heidegger even devoted a whole seminar to this book. The texts that he wrote on Jünger, collected together in a volume of almost 500 pages published in Germany in 2004 (volume 90 of his complete works, still in the course of publication by Vittorio Klostermann!), testify eloquently.

In Jünger, Heidegger admired someone who had understood the world based on the will to power and had clarified the role played by technology in this perspective. The Figure of the Worker is indeed present in the world in the form of power. It is through the Figure of the Worker that Technology, as engine and instrument, brings about “total mobilization.” In a direct reference to The Worker Heidegger wrote: “Work . . . today rises to the metaphysical rank of this unconditional objectification of all things present, which deploys its being in the will to will” (Vorträge und Aufsätze).

Heidegger was an admiring reader of Jünger, but also a critical one. The dialogue the two men maintained, often indirectly, proves this unambiguously. The best way to appreciate what separates them is to read side by side the texts they dedicated to one another on their respective 60th birthdays: Jünger’s “Over the Line” (Über die Linie), (1950) and Heidegger’s “Regarding ‘The Line’” (Über « die Linie ») (1955). Both texts relate to the essence of modern technology and the light it throws on the concept of nihilism. It is noteworthy that Nietzsche constitutes the central axis of the dialogue between Heidegger and Jünger.

In his text of 1950, Jünger in effect takes Nietzsche’s thought as the starting point for a tentative evaluation of contemporary nihilism. He concludes with a kind of optimism that the worst passed. The modern world, he says, has passed the “zero point,” i.e., the watershed of nihilism, while Heidegger affirms, on the contrary, that this world is more than ever plunged into the “oblivion of Being” that is impossible to escape unless one abandons the language of metaphysics (“the zero line, where the fulfillment reaches the end, is ultimately the least visible of all”).

Without going too far into abstract details, a review is necessary here. In the two volumes collecting his lecture courses on Nietzsche (1936–46), Heidegger claims that although the author of Thus spoke Zarathustra closes the circle of Western metaphysics, he nevertheless remains locked inside it. The will to power, in his eyes, is only the “will to will,” i.e., exacerbated subjectivity (it is a “will to itself,” a will that depends on itself at the same time as it is posited as its own object). The modern epoch of decline is that of the completion of metaphysics in the form of the metaphysics of the will, of which Nietzsche is the last representative. For Nietzsche, ultimately, “power and will have the same meaning.” Heidegger invites Jünger to think beyond the Nietzschean metaphysics of the will to power, the modern metaphysics of subjectivity upon which he continues to depend.

Heidegger has nothing but the highest opinion of Nietzsche. And of Jünger. He only invites him to think further. Ernst Jünger, it should also be emphasized, is one of the very rare authors with whom Heidegger agreed, after 1945, to maintain a continued dialogue, which is assuredly not nothing.

For the 80th birthday of the author of In Storms of Steel, Heidegger sent this message to him: “Remain with the luminous spirit of decision that you have always demonstrated in the quite distinct way in which you speak.” The sort of remark that one imagines would be badly conveyed today by text message or email!

Note

[1] Ernst Jünger and Martin Heidegger, Correspondance 1949–1975, ed. and trans. Julien Hervier (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 2010).

It is worth nothing that a good dozen volumes gathering the letters exchanged by Jünger with his principal correspondents have appeared in Germany in recent years. I would like to see translations of some of these, in particular his correspondence with Friedrich Hielscher (2005) and above all Carl Schmitt (2006). This last volume runs nearly 1000 pages.

April 1st

Луна, Биржа и Полиция

"Незнайка на Луне" - дважды сегодня слышу об этой книге, по радио в передаче о буржуйском аналитике-знатоке Носова и вот почта принесла цитату:
"… А кто такие эти полицейские? – спросила Селедочка. – "Бандиты! – с раздражением сказал Колосок. – Честное слово, бандиты! По-настоящему, обязанность полицейских – защищать население от грабителей, в действительности же они защищают лишь богачей. А богачи-то и есть самые настоящие грабители. Только грабят они нас, прикрываясь законами, которые сами придумывают. А какая, скажите, разница, по закону меня ограбят или не по закону? Да мне все равно!" – "Тут у вас как-то чудно! – сказал Винтик. – Зачем же вы слушаетесь полицейских и еще этих... как вы их называете, богачей?" – "Попробуй тут не послушайся, когда в их руках все: и земля, и фабрики, и деньги, и вдобавок оружие! – Колосок пригорюнился. – Теперь вот явлюсь домой, – сказал он, – а полицейские схватят меня и посадят в кутузку. И семена отберут. Это ясно! Богачи не допустят, чтоб кто-нибудь сажал гигантские растения".

Ernst Jünger “On Danger”


New German Critique, no. 59 (Spring/Summer 1993

Among the signs of the epoch we have now entered belongs the increased intrusion of danger into daily life. There is no accident concealing itself behind this fact but a comprehensive change of the inner and outer world.

We see this dearly when we remember what an important role was assigned to the concept of security in the bourgeois epoch just past. The bourgeois person is perhaps best characterized as one who places security among the highest of values and conducts his life accordingly. His arrangements and systems are dedicated to securing his space against the danger that at times, when scarcely a cloud appears to darken the sky, has laded into the distance. However, it is always there: it seeks with elemental constancy to break through the dams with which order has surrounded itself.

The peculiarity of the bourgeois’ relation to danger lies in his perception of it as an irresolvable contradiction to order, that is, as senseless. In this he marks himself off from other figures of, for example, the warrior, the artist, and the criminal, who are given a lofty or base relation to the elemental. Thus battle, in the eyes of the warrior, is a process that completes itself in a high order; the tragic conflict, for the writer, is a condition in which the deeper sense of life is to be comprehended very clearly; and a burning city or one beset by insurrection is a field of intensified activity for the criminal. In turn bourgeois values possess just as little validity for the believing person, for the gods appear in the elements, as in the burning bush unconsumed by the flames. Through misfortune and danger late draws the mortal into the superior sphere of a higher order.

The supreme power through which the bourgeois sees security guaranteed is reason. The closer he finds himself to the center of reason, the more the dark shadows in which danger conceals itself disperse, and the ideal condition which it is the task of progress to achieve consists of the world domination of reason through which the wellsprings of the dangerous are not merely to be minimized but ultimately to be dried up altogether. The dangerous reveals itself in the light of reason to be senseless and relinquishes its claim on reality. In this world all depends on the perception of the dangerous as the senseless, then in the same moment it is overcome, it appears in the mirror of reason as an error.

This can be demonstrated everywhere and in detail within the intellectual and actual arrangements of the bourgeois world. It reveals itself at large in the endeavor to see the state, which rests on hierarchy, as society, with equality as its fundamental principle and which is founded through an act of reason. It reveals itself in the comprehensive establishment of an insurance system, through which not only the risk of foreign and domestic politics but also that of private life is to be uniformly distributed and thus subordinated to reason. It reveals itself further in the many and very entangled efforts to understand the life of the soul as a series of causes and effects and thus to remove it from an unpredictable into a predictable condition, therefore to include it within the sphere in which consciousness holds sway.

In this sense the securing of life against late, that great mother of danger, appears as the truly bourgeois problem, which is then made subject to the most diverse economic or humanitarian solutions. All formulations of questions at present, whether aesthetic, scientific, or political in nature, move in the direction of the claim that conflict is avoidable. Should conflict nevertheless arise, as cannot, for example, be overlooked in regard to the permanent tact of war or criminality, then all depends upon proving it to be an error whose repetition is to be avoided through education or enlightenment. These errors appear for the sole reason that the factors of that great equation — the result of which has the population of the globe becoming a unified, fundamentally good as well as fundamentally rational, and therefore also fundamentally secure humanity — have not yet achieved general recognition. Faith in the persuasive force of these views is one of the reasons that enlightenment tends to overestimate the powers given to it.

One of the best objections that has been raised against this valuation is that under such circumstances life would be intolerably boring. This objection has never been of a purely theoretical nature but was applied practically by those young persons who, in the foggy dark of night, left their parental home to pursue danger in America, on the sea, or in the French Foreign Legion. It is a sign of the domination of bourgeois values that danger slips into the distance, “far away in Turkey,” in those lands where pepper grows, or wherever the bourgeois likes to deplore everyone not conforming to his standards. For these values to disappear entirely, however, will never be possible, not just because they are always present but above all because the human heart is in need not only of security but of danger too. Yet this desire is capable of revealing itself in bourgeois society only as protest, and it indeed does appear, in the form of romantic protest. The bourgeois has nearly succeeded in persuading the adventurous heart that the dangerous is not present at all. Thus do figures become possible who scarcely dare to speak their own superior language, whether that of the poet, who compares himself to the albatross, whose powerful wings are nothing more than the object of a tedious curiosity in a foreign and windless environment, or that of the born warrior, who appears to be a ne’er-do-well because the life of a shopkeeper tills him with disgust. Countless examples could show how in an era of great security any profitable life will depart for the distances symbolized by strange lands, intoxication, or death.

In this sense the world war appears as the great, red balance line under the bourgeois era, the spirit of which explained — that is, believed itself capable of invalidating — the jubilation of the volunteer who welcomed the war by attributing to him either a patriotic error or a suspect lust for adventure. Fundamentally, however, this jubilation was a revolutionary protest against the values of the bourgeois world; it was a recognition of fate as the expression of the supreme power. In this jubilation a revaluation of all values, which had been prophesied by exalted spirits, was completed: alter an era that sought to subordinate fate to reason, another followed which saw reason as the servant of fate. From that moment on, danger was no longer the goal of a romantic opposition; it was rather reality, and the task of the bourgeois was once again to withdraw from this reality and escape into the utopia of security. From this moment on, the words peace and order became a slogan to which a weaker morale resorted.

This was a war that not only nations but two epochs conducted against each other. As a consequence, both victors and vanquished exist here in Germany. Victors are those who, like salamanders, have gone through the school of danger. Only these will hold their own in a time when not security but danger will determine the order of life.

Precisely for this reason, however, the tasks that order must accomplish have become much more comprehensive than before; these tasks have to be performed where danger is not the exception, but is constantly present. As an example of this the police force might be mentioned. It has transformed itself from a group of civil servants into a formation that already greatly resembles a military unit. Likewise the various large parties acknowledge the need to adopt means of power that express the fact that the battle of opinions will not be decided solely through votes and programs but also by the stalwarts committed to march in support of those programs. Such facts are in no way to be isolated and regarded as a temporary or transient change in the political landscape. Nor can the inclination to danger be overlooked in intellectual endeavors, and it is unmistakable that new forms of the volcanic spirit are at work. Phenomena like modern atomic theory, glacial cosmogony, the introduction of the concept of mutation into zoology all point clearly, completely apart from their truth content, to how strongly the spirit is beginning to partake of explosive events. The history of inventions also raises ever more clearly the question of whether a space of absolute comfort or a space of absolute danger is the final aim concealed in technology. Completely apart from the circumstance that scarcely a machine, scarcely a science has ever existed which did not fulfill, directly or indirectly, dangerous functions in the war, inventions like the automobile engine have already resulted in greater losses than any war, be it ever so bloody.

What especially characterizes the era in which we find ourselves, into which we enter more deeply with every passing day, is the close relationship that exists between danger and order. It may be expressed in this way: danger appears merely as the other side of our order. The whole is more or less equivalent to our image of the atom, which is utterly mobile and utterly constant. The secret concealed within is a new and different return to nature; it is the fact that we are simultaneously civilized and barbaric, that we have approached the elemental without having sacrificed the acuity of our consciousness. Thus does the path through which danger has penetrated our life present itself as twofold. It has intruded upon us first of all out or an arena in which nature is still more vital. Things, “the likes of which were only possible in South America,” are now familiar to us. The distinction is that danger, from a romantic dimension, has in this way become real. Secondly, however, we are sending danger back out over the globe in a new form.

This new form of danger appears in the closest connection having been made between elemental events and consciousness. The elemental is eternal: as people have always found themselves in passionate struggle with things, animals, or other people, as is the case today. The particular characteristic of our era, however, is precisely that all this transpires in the presence of the most acute consciousness. This finds expression above all in the circumstance that in all of these conflicts the most powerful servant of consciousness, the machine, is always present. Thus does humanity’s eternal struggle with the elemental nature of the sea present itself in the temporal form of a supremely complicated mechanical contrivance. Thus does the battle appear as a process during which the armored engine moves fighting men through the sea, over land, or into the air. Thus does the daily accident itself, with which our newspapers are tilled, appear nearly exclusively as a catastrophe of a technological type.

Beyond all this the wonder of our world, at once sober and dangerous, is the registration of the moment in which the danger transpires — a registration that is moreover accomplished whenever it does not capture human consciousness immediately, by means of machines. One needs no prophetic talent to predict that soon any given event will be there to see or to hear in any given place. Already today there is hardly an event of human significance toward which the artificial eye of civilization, the photographic lens, is not directed. The result is often pictures of demoniacal precision through which humanity’s new relation to danger becomes visible in an exceptional fashion. One has to recognize that it is a question here much less of the peculiarity of new tools than of a new style that makes use of technological tools. The change becomes illuminating in the investigation of the change in tools that have long been at our disposal, such as language. Although our time produces little in the way of literature in the old sense, much of significance is accomplished through objective reports of experience. Our time is prompted by human need — which explains, among other things, the success of war literature. We already possess a new style of language, one which gradually becomes visible from underneath the language of the bourgeois epoch. The same, however, is true of our style altogether; it is reminiscent of the tact that the automobile was for a long time constructed in the form of a horse-drawn coach, or that a wholly different society has already long since established itself beneath the surface of bourgeois society. As during the inflation, we continue for a time to spend the usual coins, without sensing that the rate of exchange is no longer the same.

In this sense, it may be said that we have already plunged deeply into new, more dangerous realms, without our being conscious of them.

21 июля


* 2009, ум. ген. Петров, Москва (вероятно, убит)
* 1911, род. Маршалл Маклюэн

  ПРОИЗОШЛО
* 1861, Первое сражение при Булл-Ран (First Battle of Manassas), 1-е крупное сражение в Гражданской войне в США.
* 1936, начало осады Алькасара
* 1941, первый налет авиации Германии на Москву (в ночь 21/22, начался в 21-25 по поясному мск)
* 1969, Армстронг спустился на поверхность Луны (2ч 56мин по Гринвичу).
* 1983, на антарктической станции «Восток» зафиксирована самая низкая температура на планете за историю наблюдения: −89,2 °C.

  В ЛИТЕРАТУРЕ
* 1796, ум. Роберт Бёрнс (гэльск. Raibeart Burns)
* 1865, род. Мэтью Фипс Шилл (+), Британские Антильские о-ва
* 2014, Путин подписал изменения в фед. закон "Об исчислении времени" (вступили в силу 26 окт 2014) - моск. время стало соответствовать UTC+3ч, отменены сезонные переходы

  В МУЗЫКЕ
* 1865, ум. Ludwig Schnorr von Carolsfeld, 1-й исполнитель Тристана.
* 1893, ум. Карл Рёниш (по др. данным, 1892)
* 1938, премьера балета Хиндемита "St Francis" ('Noblissima Visione, a Dance Legend').
* 1942, Эльмендорф (& Марта Фукс) исполнил в Байройте Götterdämmerung / youtube
* 1948, род. Юсуф Ислам (Cat Stevens), Лондон

  8 июля ПО ЮЛИАНСКОМУ
* 1906, Пётр Столыпин назначен главой правительства России.
* 1917, после отставки кн. Львова 7го июля, Керенский стал министром-председателем Временного правительства.

был юпитер

вчера посетил Вику (от которой некогда впервые услышал о ЖЖ во дворике Маяковского после чтений кого-то с Южинского, а накануне в четверг временно "откинул копыта" козёл Фрэнк, питающийся, как известно, удалёнными постингами [как тут не вспомнить о том, что 5 лет назад, в августе, в связи c роковым приездом Фитцпатрика, мой тёзка подарил СУПу купленного в Кимрах козла и о фотке однофамильно-кимрской горы с козлами, а, как известно, на кимрском trefan = territory] - произошла "мощнейшая DDoS-атака за время существования ресурса", начавшаяся ещё в прошлый четверг), обогатившись переведённым ею и недавно изданным Дегреллем - вчера ведь была годовщина его смерти в 1994 (и выхода Матрицы в 1999), я же подарил болонское издание 1935 прозы Кардуччи в тактильно-приятной обложке того же терракотового цвета, что и сам этот город, запомнившийся мне старым домом с выщербленными каменными ступенями в молодой зелени и занимающим второй этаж хозяином-кинолюбителем: каменная стена была в полках со старыми фильмами в бетакаме), тема Бельгии звучала весь вечер, даже непреднамеренное появление Траппистов и мой рассказ о посещении в Брюсселе "Жизни с Богом" (все книжки "Светлова" - незабываемый юношеский ликбез от Любимова в эпоху Студии электронной музыки в подвале Скрябина) - уже позже, когда строгого вида лакец вёз меня от к/т Космос мимо дома Перловых, в котором прапрадед купил квартиру и где прошло 14 лет моей жизни, на Фрунзенскую наб.: видеомонтаж концерта в ДОМе закончили. Чем больше я слушаю то короткое своё выступление, тем меньше оно мне нравится, в осн. из-за Блютнера, звучащего как Эстония (на котором я не играл прежде и не успел приноровиться), грубым и неподатливым, и когда Мартынов позвонил с предложением, сказал ему - "но там же плохой рояль", "но я же играю", - ответил приятель обоих Любимовых, "ты играешь на всём", - сказал я. Блютнер стоял в школьном зале, 12 лет это был как бы основной концертный рояль для меня, и Блютнер был у 1-й моей девушки, если под первой понимать взаимное лишение девственности в несколько макабрических обстоятельствах. Но те были ненамного старше и звучали намного лучше.

из сети:
* в целом - вероятно, лучшее, что я читал о Ливии в этот месяц: беседа на Эхе с Чамовым (с неожиданной ремаркой: Я знаю, что такое шииты, это люди очень серьезные. Если они взялись за дело, они его будут делать). Жаль, что мало сказано об исламской составляющей среди инсургентов: порой я думаю, что агрессоры постарались, прежде всего, перехватить инициативу именно в этом отношении
* В Дагестан и Кабардино-Балкарию переброшено 6 тысяч войск МВД
* Проханов, Цель революции - бессмертие
* Как Эстония уморила русских белогвардейцев в концлагерях
* А. Пушков, "Теперь Иран точно создаст свою атомную бомбу"
* youtube: Japan earthquake and nuclear "accident" are tectonic nuclear warfare
* Роспотребнадзор: Сканеры в аэропортах вредны для пассажиров
* Половина всего имущества Земли принадлежит 1% жителей